Question: Describe a likely Chinese attack on an American CVN tasked to defend Taiwan. Where would the CVN be, and what would the Chinese missile tactics be? How would the U.S. Navy defend the CVN?
- ISR and Targeting:
- China would use Yaogan satellites, WZ-8 UAVs, and over-the-horizon radar to locate the CVN. Continuous tracking is challenging due to U.S. electronic warfare (EW) and the CVN’s mobility, as China lacks a robust real-time satellite constellation.
- Decoy ships or patrol missions might bait the CSG into revealing its position, as seen in Chinese wargames.
- Missile Salvo:
- First Wave (Hypersonic ASBMs): 8–12 DF-26B or YJ-21 hypersonic missiles (Mach 10–12 terminal speed) launched from mainland sites or Type 055 destroyers, equipped with maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs) or hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), to deplete SM-3 interceptors. A 2023 Chinese wargame simulated 24 hypersonic missiles sinking the USS Gerald R. Ford and escorts.
- Second Wave (Cruise Missiles): 10–20 YJ-12 (Mach 2.5–4) or YJ-18 (Mach 2–3 terminal) cruise missiles from H-6K bombers, Type 052D destroyers, or submarines to exploit gaps after SM-3 depletion, targeting the CVN and escorts in saturation attacks.
- Mop-Up Wave: 6–8 additional hypersonic missiles (e.g., DF-27) or cruise missiles to finish damaged ships, as simulated in the USS Gerald R. Ford scenario.
- Supporting Assets: Type 093A submarines could launch YJ-18s or torpedoes, while J-15 fighters from CNS Shandong or Liaoning deploy decoys or simulated strikes.
- Goals:
- Overwhelm CSG defenses with volume to achieve a mission kill (disabling the flight deck or radar) or sink the CVN.
- Conduct a rapid, surprise “bolt-from-the-blue” attack to neutralize the CSG before U.S. response.
- Challenges:
- U.S. EW and mobility disrupt targeting.
- ISR vulnerabilities (e.g., jammed satellites) hinder the kill chain.
- Sinking a CVN risks massive U.S. retaliation, deterring attack unless China expects quick victory.
- Disrupting ISR:
- Electronic Warfare: EA-18G Growlers use Next Generation Jammers to disrupt Chinese radar, satellite links, and missile guidance.
- Deception: Decoy drones, chaff, and flares mimic the CVN’s radar signature, confusing sensors. RAND suggests “multi-domain drone mimics.”
- Anti-Satellite: Jamming or destroying Chinese ISR satellites, though escalatory.
- Active Missile Defense:
- Aegis System: Arleigh Burke destroyers and Ticonderoga cruisers use SM-3 interceptors for mid-course ballistic missile defense and SM-6 for terminal ballistic and cruise missile intercepts (up to 240 km). New SM-6 variants target hypersonic glide vehicles.
- Close-In Defense: Phalanx CIWS (20mm Gatling guns) and SeaRAM (Rolling Airframe Missiles) engage missiles within 2–10 km. Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM) provide mid-range defense.
- Directed-Energy: HELIOS lasers on destroyers disable drones or missiles, though limited by weather and power.
- Passive Defenses:
- Mobility: The CVN’s speed and unpredictable movements hinder targeting.
- Dispersal: Escorts form a 50–100-mile defensive perimeter around the CVN.
- Hardening: The CVN’s compartmentalization and redundancy mitigate damage, though hypersonic warheads pose risks.
- Air Wing:
- F-35Cs and F/A-18E/Fs intercept Chinese aircraft or missiles with AIM-120 AMRAAMs, leveraging F-35C stealth and sensors.
- MQ-25 Stingrays extend air wing range, allowing safer CVN positioning.
- Allied Support:
- Japanese Aegis destroyers and Taiwan’s Hsiung Feng III missiles engage Chinese forces closer to Taiwan.
- U.S. bombers (B-21, B-52) and Virginia-class submarines from Guam attrit Chinese assets.
- Challenges:
- Large salvos (20–24 missiles) may exhaust SM-3/SM-6 magazines, per CSIS wargames.
- Hypersonic missiles (e.g., YJ-21) challenge interceptors, though SM-6 upgrades help.
- Saturation attacks could overwhelm defenses.
- Chinese Success: A surprise salvo of 24 hypersonic missiles could sink or disable the CVN if targeting is accurate and U.S. defenses are overwhelmed, as in a 2023 Chinese simulation. However, U.S. EW and mobility make this unlikely.
- U.S. Defense: Aegis, EW, and decoys could intercept 50–70% of missiles, especially if the CVN is beyond 2,000 km. Damage is possible, but sinking is unlikely. A mission-kill could disrupt operations, though submarines and bombers continue the fight.
- Strategic Impact: A sunk CVN escalates the conflict, risking U.S. strikes on mainland China. CSIS wargames suggest U.S. resilience despite carrier losses.