Mearsheimer: Trump’s tariffs will cripple the US economy

Trump’s tariffs will cripple the US economy 

I think that people like Lindsey Graham and many people in the American foreign policy establishment have no sense of the limits of American power. Whether you're talking about military might or economic might, they think we can just run around the world pushing people around by threatening them and if the threats don't work, we can use military force against them. Maybe you could think that way during the unipolar moment, but those days are in the rearview mirror. We now live in a multipolar world. China's a peer competitor.

The big question is whether President Trump would be foolish enough to put these secondary sanctions on China and on India. With regard to China, he's had to back off with regard to tariffs because the Chinese have a lot of leverage over us when it comes to rare earths. So I don't see how he can possibly get tough with the Chinese with secondary sanctions of the magnitude that he's talking about. 

And with regard to India, it's really quite amazing what's happening there. It looked like the United States was going to have very good relations with India with Modi in the driver's seat in India and Trump in the driver's seat here in the United States. They have a history of good relations, but those relations have gone steadily downhill since Trump took over. And if he were to put secondary sanctions on India, that would just wreck our relations with India. 

And that is not in America's national interest because the United States and India have a vested interest in working together in terms of dealing with China. Furthermore, if he puts these sanctions on China and India and they actually go into effect, the end result is going to be disastrous for the international economy. So, I think this is all an empty threat. And I'm really curious what exactly he's going to do on Saturday that he thinks is going to bring the Russians or these other countries to their knees.

Since he launched this tariff campaign, I think it was on April 2nd of this year, he's gone back and forth, but he is definitely levied tariffs on a lot of countries and it has not damaged the American economy. So, I think he believes and his supporters believe that Trump can levy tariffs and get away with it. There are no real costs to pay that, the consumer is not going to have to worry about paying higher costs. But I think most people, and this would include me, believe that at some point the bill is going to come due and when it does he's going to be in serious trouble. But for the time being he's operating on the assumption that tariffs are the magic weapon. They bring everybody to their knees and uh we're not hurt at all.

>> Putin your turn is coming. You know, Donald Trump is the Scottish shuffler of American politics and foreign diplomacy, and he's about to put a whooping on your ass. What's going to happen here is that Trump is going to impose tariffs on people that buy Russian oil. China, India, and Brazil. Those three countries buy about 80% of cheap Russian oil. That's what keeps Putin's war machine going. So, President Trump's going to put a 100% tariff on all those countries, punishing them for helping Putin. Putin can live through sanctions. He could give a damn about Russian soldiers. But China, India, and Brazil, they're about to face a choice between the American economy or helping Putin.

We're talking about taking Kaliningrad in the context of an almost war between the United States and Russia. I wouldn't even call it a proxy war. I call it an almost war because it's so close to being a war. We've been very close to being fully at war with the Russians for over three years now, right? This is serious business and we've made it clear to the Russians that we're bent on knocking them out of the ranks of the great powers. We want to defeat the Russians. So it's in that context that you have General Donnu talking about American or NATO troops taking Kaliningrad. Kaliningrad is Russian territory. That's another way of saying it's sacred territory. The idea that NATO would even threaten to initiate a campaign that involves invading and conquering Kaliningrad is almost unthinkable to me.

I mean this is in my opinion a reckless statement. Look, if you're the Russians, and you know that Kaliningrad is exposed, the general is correct that it's exposed Russian territory because it's detached from mother Russia and it's surrounded by a handful of NATO states. So it's exposed and he's saying that we can take it very easily and he's intimating that we may take it very easily. Very important to understand that he's sending a signal to the Russians. We may take Kaliningrad. This means that in a crisis, the Russians have a powerful incentive to preempt to prevent that from happening.

If you get into a crisis with the Russians, you do not want them to have an incentive to preempt. And this is what that does. We would have never done anything like this in the Cold War. If you go back and look at American policy  during the cold war, we were much more cautious. Now you can say Russia is not the Soviet Union. The problem with that argument is that Russia has thousands of nuclear weapons just like the Soviet Union had thousands of nuclear weapons. And yes, Russia is not as powerful as the Soviet Union was, but that probably makes them more scared than the Soviets would have been in an analogous situation.

So you don't want to threaten these people by talking about taking Kaliningrad with great ease. It just makes no sense at all. It's a small piece of territory that used to be part of Germany. It was referred to as East Prussia. Basically the Baltic states separated from Belarus and from Russia. So it is out there by itself.

Jeffrey Sachs & Zhang Weiwei：What the West Never Understands About China

 

Jeffrey Sachs video

<Zhang Weiwei>

This morning we received a group of American students, 25, to China Institute for a dialogue which, as you said, we promote the young people's to young people dialogue, and I try to describe the difference between Chinese and the American mentality with regard to foreign policy and security policy. There are clear differences. For the United States, it's friend or foe, very clear, good or bad, black and white. For Chinese, it's a more long-term view; it's a friend or potential friend, you know. 

Behind it, there are philosophical differences. As a civilizational state, you have a much longer vision. Even with the troubled relation between China and the Philippines, we know the Philippine politics. It goes ups and downs; this government is prodded against China. So we have patience despite whatever disputes or even so-called clash—maximum clash is a kind of firing water cannons, not real shots. Both sides show respect for the declaration on the South China Sea. Now, so here is my question.

Concerning the rise of China, it's a different type of new type of, you may say, economic, political, and military superpower. And, I remember during the time of Enlightenment, the Dutch philosopher Spinoza said something like this. He said peace is not just simply an absence of war. It's a virtue. Because he's strongly influenced by Chinese culture, and Chinese culture really adores peace, and peace is above all. Even in this famous book by Sun Tzu, *Art of War*, the number one sentence is prudence on waging a war.

Yet at the same time, you remind me of British philosopher Bertrand Russell, who came to China, Beijing, and Shanghai, in the year 1920 after the First World War. And China, because of the long experience with European powers, China lost a war again and again with different European powers. So the Chinese intellectuals were very much disappointed with Chinese culture and civilization. Yet Bertrand Russell counseled these, his counterparts in China. He said, actually, you have a wonderful civilization, especially virtue and passion for peace, and then he made a forecast which is very accurate. He said one day China will have its powerful self-defense capability. So by that time, Chinese passion and virtue of peace will be a tremendous asset for the world.

So it reminds me, in the United States, the top secret is you cannot say the US will become number two; you must, must be number one. In China, the Chinese government said we are, no, we are the second largest, not the largest, although we look at the official figures from the World Bank, IMF, already by the year 2014, 2015, China was the largest economy by purchasing power parity, yeah. So this is interesting. 

Yet not long ago, US Defense Secretary Hegseth said openly in several interviews, he said we must be very cautious with China because China's hypersonic missile system can sink all US aircraft carriers within 20 minutes. You know, where China has built up a formidable, powerful defense capability. At the same time, we said openly we will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, will not fire the first shot on whatever occasions. So with this kind of power, like China now arising, will that change the power structure in terms of the embrace of a new world order? Make the third world war less likely?

<Sachs> Of course, in the American political science, the question in international relations is exactly, is there one principle? Do we have it right? Is realism, which is the dominant school in American international relations, a summary for China and for every other place in the world? And I happen to subscribe to your view, which is that the international relations viewpoint that the US has is very particular and it's very much both a European experience and an Anglo-Saxon British experience. It is not a world theory, and we need to understand and construct a different world theory actually that can be understood by all different parts of the world. 

So, as you know, in realist theory, each nation is a sovereign actor; there is no authority above the individual nation-state, and it's a dangerous world. And in the British mentality, it is a Hobbesian world, a world of all against all, and in John Mearsheimer's idea, every country must fight for its survival. And therefore, in a dangerous world, conflict is inevitable. And as John Mearsheimer titled his book, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, there's an inevitability of tragedy because countries can't solve their problems any other way. 

And when I say to him, "But John, you make war a self-fulfilling prophecy," he says, "Yes."

I said, "But there's no reason for this war." 

Yes, but it will happen anyway. 

And what I think is true, I give him credit for it. He probably depicts the US mentality. It's not a good theory globally, in my opinion, but he depicts the US mentality. In that book, he has a chapter about China where he dismisses the idea that China has a different viewpoint. I think he's wrong, basically. Uh, and I think he's historically wrong and conceptually wrong on this.

To my mind the difference between China and the Western experience is that China really has been a unified, continental-scale nation for more than 2,000 years, maybe you could say 2,246 years since 221 BC. And there have been periodic breakdowns between dynasties, but basically, China's been unified. Europe was nearly unified under the Roman Empire. Not fully because east of the Rhine and north of the Danube, Rome never controlled that part of Europe. 

But the Roman Empire was very impressive, and it was very large-scale, and it was very stable for many centuries, actually. So it was almost five centuries of essentially stability. But then it broke down in 476 in the western part of the Roman Empire. And never again was Europe unified despite many attempts by Charlemagne, by the Holy Roman Empire, by Napoleon, by Hitler. Europe never unified again. There's a big question why. By the way, I think it's a good, deep historical question, though we don't get to run experiments to test it.

I think there are two parts to this, and the book by E.L. Jones about about Europe is quite good on this. First, the physical geography made unification of China more successful because China is like a box, and in the north is drylands, in the west is the Himalayas, in the south is the rainforest, and in the east is the ocean. And so that box is not so easy to invade except from the north. But you can't invade over the Himalayas. It's very hard to invade from the Pacific side, and the rainforest between China and Southeast Asia is really also a difficult disease barrier and logistical barrier. So, China had a geographic unity. 

Europe is very difficult. There are so many places where you can take power where you can invade, and so on. So, this is one difference. Second, I think, I guess, that the linguistic unity of China played a big role because China did the impossible, which was to have one written language and dozens of spoken languages. Truly, as an outsider, I don't understand it until today, even though people have tried to explain it to me many times. But still, that unity of language served to unify the political sphere already 2,000 years ago. And language is the biggest divider in world culture, for sure. If you speak the other language, you're much less likely to go to war. If you speak a different language, war sometimes seems inevitable because you don't know what they're talking about. And as primitive as that sounds, I think it's a very big deal in Europe.

Europe, till today, is not a unified idea. It is still 27 different countries, each with their own prerogatives in a semi-unity. And that's why Europe is not a great power because it's too internally weak and divided, actually, to play the role of a great power. So when it comes to geopolitics, to my mind, this changed a lot. First, internally, China did not have the experience of war other than from the north, other than the wars coming from the steppe regions, and it had hundreds and hundreds of years of peace. So peace is not an idea foreign to China, but in Europe, it was war all the time for 2,000 years, almost, or for 1,500 years, almost no peace. Britain and France fought each other almost every year. And then the other thing is, I believe, but I stand to be corrected, but I think that the Confucian, and common culture of East Asia made a big difference.

So empirically, we know from 1368, from the beginning of the Ming until 1839, the arrival of the British, China never fought a war with its eastern neighbors, never launched a war with its eastern neighbors. 500 years, never invaded Korea, never invaded Japan one day, not even once, and had 17 years of war with Vietnam, with the northern part of Vietnam, from 1410 to 1427. And other than that, no wars. So how can you make a theory if you were a realist theorist for 500 years? You would have no job, no war, complete failure, nothing to describe. So how can we assume it's the same idea, the same mindset? 

I don't think it is. I think there really is a different mindset, and I think it's true—never in its entire history did China go out for an overseas conquest. Never. Whereas Europe did for the last 500 years, and before that, if it could manage, it did that within the Mediterranean region and in the Middle East for 2,000 years. So I think the history is really different, and the mindset is really different, and we need a theory of international relations that also respects those differences and helps people to understand them.

When I say this in the United States, they say, "Oh, that's ridiculous." They can't imagine peace. How could China and Japan never go to war for a thousand years? Whereas Britain and France were at war, as I said, almost every year. And when the invasions came, it was all from Japan's side to invade China rather than from the Chinese side to invade Japan, other than the two attempts by the Mongol emperors, in 1274 and 1281 to invade Japan. But that, I don't count as a Chinese invasion. I count that as a Mongol invasion. Other than that, China never attacked Japan. So also, I say to my Japanese friends, get over it. You attacked them. They didn't attack you. So stop regarding China as an enemy and stop relying on the US for your defense because you don't need defense from China. China's not going to invade Japan. It never did. It never will. That's my view.

<Zhang Weiwei>

Thank you. And I just make a very brief comment, and then we open the floor. You mentioned this Chinese tradition of preserving peace and stability. It reminds me of the fact today, you know, the Munich Security Conference issued a report, the year before; it's called a lose-lose, actually, it's a lose-lose for Europe. If you look at Asia, take China as an example, it's a win-win, five decades without war, focus on development and prosperity, so a sharp contrast. The key difference: China plays a peaceful role; the United States plays a warlike role. That's the key difference. Yet at the same time, as a modern state, China is very firm. We don't understand why Russia tolerated NATO expansion—five expansions. China said, even not once, NATO can expand to Asia. Forbidden. So this is very important.

Rubio targeting Chinese studemts

https://www.axios.com/2025/05/28/student-visas-china-us-rubio

Mahbubani: Why China and USA Clash

Why China and USA Clash

The US China geopolitical contest which the United States has launched is driven by deep structural forces. President Donald Trump started this contest. He was defeated in the 2020 election. 

President Joe Biden came in, he disagreed with Donald Trump on everything except on China. President Joe Biden has not been able to lift a single tariff on China. Not one. That shows that personalities is not what is driving this contest.

It's structural forces and we must understand these structural forces. So what are the structural forces? There are at least three. The first is that, and this is an iron law of geopolitics, that has been around for 2,000 maybe 3,000 years. Whenever the world's number one emerging power, which today is China, is about to overtake the world's number one power, which today is United States. The world's number one power always pushes down the world's number one emerging power. And this has been happening for 2,000 years. So in some ways when the United States is fighting so hard to retain his number one position is actually behaving very normally. This is what all great powers have done for thousands of years.

But what is puzzling, you know, and I say this because I've been in the United States now for one week and I am actually surprised that even though as I explained later it may not necessarily be in United States interest to launch this contest against China. There is a rock solid consensus in the American body politic and when I speak to so many Americans here and I've been here for one week now they seem determined to stand up to China even though it may not necessarily be in the American interest. So this is what in many ways is driving this contest, this enormous desire of the United States to remain number one in the world. So that's the first factor that's making it inevitable.

The second factor that's making this contest inevitable is the first one by the way I want to emphasize everybody talks about it. Mr. Wong Huya mentioned Graham Ellison he's also written a book as you know about the inevitability of war within US and China and then he he talks about this what he calls the thucydides trap. So the first point I made everybody knows about but the second point I'm going to make nobody talks about especially in the US because it's politically incorrect to mention it because the second structural force that's driving this contest is what I call the fear of the yellow peril.

Now the fear of the yellow peril has laid buried in the western imagination for 800 years. And by the way I want to explain that this fear is not an imagination of mine because it has surfaced in American history. And about 130 years ago you should know this historical fact. The United States Congress passed an act called the Chinese racial exclusion act. Let me repeat that. The Chinese racial exclusion act. So that is a very powerful demonstration of the fear of the yellow peril. So when we try to analyze and understand this US China contest, we try to look for the rational factors that are driving it. 

But there also emotional factors and these emotional factors are also very powerful. And when I said earlier that having been in the United States now for one week, I can feel the emotions towards China have become very very negative. But I have to be here to feel it, to absorb it before I can confirm it. And that's what I've experienced this very powerful emotional reaction to China.

And the third structural force that's also driving this contest is a kind of a bipartisan disappointment in the United States that American engagement with China has not created a liberal democracy in China. Now this is again not something I'm imagining because as you'll see in my book I quote a very important American official in the Biden administration his name is Kurt Campbell and he published an essay in the magazine Foreign Affairs I think with another official called Elli Rner and he said that the Americans believed that after America opened up China economically, China would also open up politically, China would become a liberal democracy and America and China would live happily ever after. 

Now, as you can tell from the way I'm saying it, it sounds like a fairy tale. And it is a fairy tale because in many ways it's very puzzling and this is what my book tries to do, to try and in a sense explain Chinese history to the Americans that how is it a country like United States which is only less than 250 years old with one quarter the population of China. America believe, hey, we can change China, which has got a population four times the size of America and a history that is 4,000 years old at least, maybe 5,000 years.

So, what was behind this American belief that this young American republic could transform one of the most ancient civilizations that we have today? But that in itself is an indication the misunderstandings that Americans have which is what my book tries to point out. 

The other paradox is that even though the United States has launched this contest against China it doesn't have a strategy. I happened to have a one-on-one lunch with uh America's greatest living strategic thinker Henry Kissinger. And at that lunch he said to me, you know, and he allowed me to quote me quote him as saying that that United States doesn't have a strategy for managing China. But even if he hadn't said it to me, it's pretty obvious because when America launched this geopolitical contest against China, it hasn't specified what are its objectives. 

What does America hope to accomplish in launching this contest against China? It could be number one isolating China from the rest of the world as it succeeded in doing with the Soviet Union, containing the Soviet Union. It could be overthrowing the Communist Party of China. It could be preventing China from becoming the number one economy in the world. And I suggest these three objectives because if you analyze them, none of these three objectives are achievable.

Now, if you want to launch a contest, you must have very clear objectives. What are you trying to accomplish? And the United States has never specified and never understood what it wants to do with SV China. And so that's the other paradox about the United States decision to launch this contest against China. 

But having said that, let me now turn to the other half of the first paradox I spoke about which is that while it is inevitable, it is also avoidable. So why is this contest avoidable? And there are several reasons. In fact, in my last chapter of my book, I talk about the five non-contradictions between US and China. And I hope if you have a chance to read the book, uh please look at the five non-contradictions.

By the way, the phrase non-contradiction itself is a very clumsy English phrase that is very rarely used, but I use it just to just to explain why this is so unusual because there's actually no fundamental reason why the US and China should clash with each other. And so, let me give you two examples of why the United States and China should not clash with each other. 

The first reason is that if the fundamental national interest of United States and if the fundamental national interest of China is to improve the well-being of their people to make them improve their living standards and make them better and so on so forth then frankly the US and China should be working together because they have a common interest in improving the well-being of their people and if they cooperate, if they trade with each other, they will get better, right?

And the tragedy here is that the United States is the only major developed country where the average income of the bottom 50 50% has not improved for three decades. And the living conditions of the bottom 50% have deteriorated. In fact, there's another Nobel laureate Angus Don whom I quote in my book who's published a book called Deaths of Despair and he talks about how you know all the indicators of well-being are deteriorating in America. 

Life expectancy is coming down. Shocking in a major developed country, right? And poverty is growing. suicides are growing. That's very sad. So if the primary interest of the United States is to improve the well-being of its people, it should logically press the pause button on the geopolitical contest against China and actually work with China to improve the well-being of its people.

And as you will see in the book, I discuss that in some detail of how they can cooperate on things like infrastructure and other areas to improve their well-being. So that's one area where there's a non-contradiction. The second area where there's a non-contradiction and where actually US and China should work together is in the area of global challenges. Clearly United States and China face common global challenges and we've seen this in  covid-19 has shown how much the world has shrunk and how much we are all as Kofi Anan the late UN General will say we're now living in the same global village. It's no longer a huge planet. It is one small global village.

So anything that happens to us affects all of us. So we should be cooperating. If you live in a village, you should be cooperating to fight against the common dangers whether it's COVID 19 or if it's climate change and you cannot solve climate change unless US and China collaborate. So you can see they're very powerful reasons why US and China should collaborate. So that's what I'm trying to achieve in my book to try and persuade both countries. Please press the pause button on what you are doing and focus on cooperating because that's what the world wants you to do.

I have a whole chapter in my book which says that out of the 7.8 billion people in the world. There are 330 million who live in United States. There are 1.4 billion who live in China. But there's still six billion people who live outside the United States and China. And these six billion people if you ask them privately confidentially would you like the US China geopolitical contest to accelerate or would you like us and China to stop this contest? And I can tell you that the overwhelming majority of the 6 billion people who live outside US and China want both countries to say stop this contest because it is not helping anybody. It is not helping the United States, is not helping China and is not helping the rest of the world.

And I can tell you as someone who lives in Southeast Asia, as you know, which is just south of China, if you did a poll of the 650 million people who live in ASEAN, they will say that they want this contest to pause because the Southeast Asian countries want to have good relations with United States and they want to have good relations with China and they don't want to be forced to choose. And that's the view of the overwhelming majority of the world's population. 

So in that sense I hope that my book will be helpful to both US and China because it will help to persuade them that given the larger global challenges that we face. Let's come together, work together and defeat these common challenges and press the pause button on this geopolitical contest. Thank you very much.

fentanyl imports

 

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg93nn1e6go

In 2019, China classified fentanyl as a controlled narcotic and later added some of the chemicals used to make it to the list.

Despite this, the trade in other chemicals involved in the manufacturing of fentanyl - some of which can have legitimate purposes - remain uncontrolled, as those involved in the trade find new ways to evade the law.

A review of several US indictments, which include details of undercover agents communicating with Chinese manufacturers, suggests that some chemical companies in China have been selling chemicals - including controlled ones - in the knowledge that they are intended to make fentanyl.

Mahbubani: War with China should be avoided

This is WHY the USA Will LOSE to China

What inspired you to write this book?

Professor Kishore Mahbubani:
Well, I see a great tragedy coming and it's a completely unnecessary tragedy. This coming geopolitical contest between the United States and China. And the basic message of my book is a very simple one, which is that a geopolitical contest between the United States and China is both inevitable and avoidable. So I try to explain in the main part of my book why it's inevitable and why also the United States should really think very hard and deep before it plunges into this geopolitical contest with China.

What I try to point out in the book is that there are lots of misconceptions that Americans have about their own strengths and about China's weaknesses. It is taken as an ideological certainty that when a thriving democracy takes on a geopolitical struggle against the communist party system, the thriving democracy will always win as it demonstrated in the first world war against the Soviet Union. But then if you dig deeper and you try to understand what is the core situation of American society today and the core situation of Chinese society, you discover that the United States is actually having to deal with some major structural challenges.

One of the key structural challenges is that the average income of the bottom 50% of the American population has been sliding down over a 30-year period. And as I try to analyze in the book, this is not just an accident. This is a result of deep structural forces in American society that have moved America away from being a thriving democracy towards becoming a plutoaucracy.

And by contrast, China in the 30-year period where the average income of the bottom 50% in America has been sliding down, this in the same 30-year period, the bottom 50% in China have had their best 30 years in 3,000 years. So at a time when the Chinese people are experiencing the most amazing improvements in their standard of living, you must remember also for most of Chinese history, the bottom 50% struggle to survive. They would die in famines and civil wars and they had a very rough life and the last 30 years they have access to education, housing, health care, travel in a way they never ever had before in their lives.

So after China has gone through the best 30-year period ever under the Chinese Communist Party, the United States is telling the Chinese people, why don't you get rid of Chinese Communist Party? And the Chinese people are scratching their head and say, "Excuse me, you know, I've had the best 30 years." And the Chinese Communist Party is succeeding because while in theory it is still a Communist Party, it is a Communist Party that is the exact opposite of the Soviet Communist Party because the Soviet Communist Party was run by all apparatchiks.

The Chinese Communist Party may possibly be the most meritocratic political party in the world and the selection process results in the best minds running China today. You met somebody you know you know Wangi Shan you know how brilliant these people are. So by by going into this old ideological reflex and saying hey democracies can always overcome communist parties. The United States hasn't done a deeper analysis and realize that this is not a contest within a democracy and a communist party system.

It's a contest between a plutoaucracy and a meritocracy.

<Johnson>

You talked about it being a party of representation, how that is maintained, whether that is stable. It is still true for the last 30 years.

<Mahbubani>

You see at the end of the day, running China, keeping a country of 1.4 billion together every day is a massive challenge. Which is why for most of Chinese history, China has more often been divided than united. So the periods like what China has experienced in the last 30 years with the strong central government delivering phenomenal improvement in living standards to its people is very rare in Chinese history.

And so if you compare the record in governance of the Chinese Communist Party especially after Deng Xiaoing launched his four modernizations 40 years ago in 1979. It's quite amazing what China has accomplished and the Chinese must always measure the record of their governance not against what other countries have achieved but what has been achieved in Chinese history. And no Chinese government ever in Chinese history has improved the living standards of the Chinese people as much as the Chinese Communist Party has.

And you're right, I call it the Chinese civilization party because the main goal of the Chinese Communist Party is not to promote or to export communist ideology. The main goal of the Chinese Communist Party is to revive Chinese civilization and bring it back to the to the standing and respect that it used to enjoy in the world for over 2,000 years. And the key driving force in the Chinese mind which I think every American should be aware of is that the Chinese are acutely aware that they went through something like maybe 150 years of national humiliation starting from the opium war of 1842 probably you know going up to the Japanese occupation. 

So they've gone through a lot of humiliation and their desire therefore is to regain the respect that China used to enjoy and it is somewhat sad that just at the moment when the Chinese people feel that hey we are now finally achieving something meaningful that's the time when America decides to slap China and for them the only thing they remember is you see they're trying to humiliate us again. Well, I think you know the the the reason why I encourage uh Americans to think deeper is that if they look very carefully at the track record of what China is doing and what the Soviet Union is doing? 

It is actually quite shocking that in the geopolitical contest today between China and United States instead of China behaving like the Soviet Union it is the United States that's behaving like the Soviet Union because I explain in the book in one chapter I asked can America make U-turns. 

So for example the contest between United States and China will not take place in the military sphere. It will be in a nuclear war with the United China. There will not be a winner and a loser. There'll be a loser and loser. 

So logically, it should be in the interest of the United States therefore to reduce its defense budget and take the money and invest in R&D because that's where the real contest is. But the United States cannot reduce its defense budget because no matter how brilliant a defense secretary you have whether is Ash Carter or General Matters because the process of deciding where to spend money is locked in by the US Congress and allocations are made to each constituency by the congressman and therefore the defense budget is large, irrational and unnecessary. If the United States was serious about taking on China is to cut his defense budget into half but that's impossible and in that sense it's like the old Soviet Union that also couldn't cut his defense budget. 

So in that sense the United States hasn't thought very hard and very deep about how different this contest with China is whereas by contrast the Chinese are quite happy. They're growing their defense budget but at a fixed percentage of their GNP and not increasing it. 

And the Chinese are very happy that America has 13 aircraft carrier fleets because each aircraft carrier fleet is draining millions of dollars away from the US Treasury every day. And paradoxically in military terms an aircraft carrier today is a sitting duck. And as an American professor, Tim Cotton of Harvard told me, it just takes a $100,000 hypersonic missile to bring down a billion dollar aircraft carrier. So it doesn't make sense anymore. 

So clearly you need to have a fundamental strategic reboot in American thinking. And I'm in that sense, I'm trying to be helpful to America. I say think very hard about what are the big changes you need to make. 

racist Tom Cotton and China

 

https://cbsaustin.com/news/nation-world/sen-tom-cotton-warns-china-poses-existential-threat-to-us-communist-arkansas-representative-seven-things-you-cant-say-about-china-military-war-president-donald-trump

Republican Sen. Tom Cotton on Tuesday issued a stark warning about Communist China, saying many of the threats the U.S. faces "are truly existential."

Cotton, who represents Arkansas and serves as the chairman of the Select Committee of Intelligence, detailed growing concerns about China's military activities and the implications for security.

https://alec.org/article/seven-things-you-cant-say-about-china-insights-from-us-senator-tom-cotton/

Senator Cotton outlines the seven critical truths about China that are often suppressed:

China is an evil empire;

China is preparing for war;

China is waging an economic world war;

China has infiltrated our society;

China has infiltrated our government;

China is coming for our kids;

China could win.

https://wccftech.com/whats-next-for-the-once-glorified-now-desperate-intel/

Senator Tom Cotton has played a role in shaping the Republican narrative, and one of his iconic incidents is when he called out TikTok's CEO Shou Zi Chew as a 'Chinese' despite his clarifications that he is a Singaporean