Question: Describe a likely Chinese attack on an American CVN tasked to defend Taiwan. Where would the CVN be, and what would the Chinese missile tactics be? How would the U.S. Navy defend the CVN?
Answer:
A Chinese attack on a U.S. aircraft carrier (CVN) tasked with defending Taiwan would be a complex operation leveraging China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, particularly its anti-ship missiles, to disrupt U.S. power projection in a Taiwan Strait crisis. Below is a plausible scenario outlining the CVN’s likely position, Chinese missile tactics, and U.S. Navy defense strategies, based on open-source data and military analyses.
CVN Positioning
Location: The CVN, part of a Carrier Strike Group (CSG) with 1–2 cruisers, 2–3 destroyers, a submarine, and 70–80 aircraft, would likely operate in the Philippine Sea or east of Taiwan (1,800–2,500 km from China). This keeps it beyond the range of most Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) like the DF-21D (1,500 km) and reduces exposure to the DF-26B (4,000 km). Positioning near or beyond Guam allows the CVN’s air wing, extended by MQ-25 Stingray refueling drones, to strike targets in the Taiwan Strait (~2,000 miles range). Alternatively, for a show of force, the CVN could operate closer in the Philippine Sea or South China Sea (500–1,000 km from China), but this risks shorter-range missile threats (e.g., YJ-12, YJ-18). The CVN would maintain high mobility (up to 35 mph), covering over 6,000 square miles in 90 minutes to complicate targeting.
Role: The CVN projects air power, launches strikes against Chinese amphibious forces, and protects Taiwan’s airspace, but its distance reflects the missile threat, relying on submarines, bombers, and allies (e.g., Japan, Taiwan) for closer engagements.
Chinese Missile Tactics
China’s attack would aim to neutralize the CVN to achieve a “fait accompli” in Taiwan, using a multi-wave missile barrage supported by intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Tactics include:
- ISR and Targeting:
- China would use Yaogan satellites, WZ-8 UAVs, and over-the-horizon radar to locate the CVN. Continuous tracking is challenging due to U.S. electronic warfare (EW) and the CVN’s mobility, as China lacks a robust real-time satellite constellation.
- Decoy ships or patrol missions might bait the CSG into revealing its position, as seen in Chinese wargames.
- Missile Salvo:
- First Wave (Hypersonic ASBMs): 8–12 DF-26B or YJ-21 hypersonic missiles (Mach 10–12 terminal speed) launched from mainland sites or Type 055 destroyers, equipped with maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs) or hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), to deplete SM-3 interceptors. A 2023 Chinese wargame simulated 24 hypersonic missiles sinking the USS Gerald R. Ford and escorts.
- Second Wave (Cruise Missiles): 10–20 YJ-12 (Mach 2.5–4) or YJ-18 (Mach 2–3 terminal) cruise missiles from H-6K bombers, Type 052D destroyers, or submarines to exploit gaps after SM-3 depletion, targeting the CVN and escorts in saturation attacks.
- Mop-Up Wave: 6–8 additional hypersonic missiles (e.g., DF-27) or cruise missiles to finish damaged ships, as simulated in the USS Gerald R. Ford scenario.
- Supporting Assets: Type 093A submarines could launch YJ-18s or torpedoes, while J-15 fighters from CNS Shandong or Liaoning deploy decoys or simulated strikes.
- Goals:
- Overwhelm CSG defenses with volume to achieve a mission kill (disabling the flight deck or radar) or sink the CVN.
- Conduct a rapid, surprise “bolt-from-the-blue” attack to neutralize the CSG before U.S. response.
- Challenges:
- U.S. EW and mobility disrupt targeting.
- ISR vulnerabilities (e.g., jammed satellites) hinder the kill chain.
- Sinking a CVN risks massive U.S. retaliation, deterring attack unless China expects quick victory.
U.S. Navy Defense Strategies
The CSG employs layered defenses to disrupt China’s kill chain and counter missiles, using active and passive measures:
- Disrupting ISR:
- Electronic Warfare: EA-18G Growlers use Next Generation Jammers to disrupt Chinese radar, satellite links, and missile guidance.
- Deception: Decoy drones, chaff, and flares mimic the CVN’s radar signature, confusing sensors. RAND suggests “multi-domain drone mimics.”
- Anti-Satellite: Jamming or destroying Chinese ISR satellites, though escalatory.
- Active Missile Defense:
- Aegis System: Arleigh Burke destroyers and Ticonderoga cruisers use SM-3 interceptors for mid-course ballistic missile defense and SM-6 for terminal ballistic and cruise missile intercepts (up to 240 km). New SM-6 variants target hypersonic glide vehicles.
- Close-In Defense: Phalanx CIWS (20mm Gatling guns) and SeaRAM (Rolling Airframe Missiles) engage missiles within 2–10 km. Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM) provide mid-range defense.
- Directed-Energy: HELIOS lasers on destroyers disable drones or missiles, though limited by weather and power.
- Passive Defenses:
- Mobility: The CVN’s speed and unpredictable movements hinder targeting.
- Dispersal: Escorts form a 50–100-mile defensive perimeter around the CVN.
- Hardening: The CVN’s compartmentalization and redundancy mitigate damage, though hypersonic warheads pose risks.
- Air Wing:
- F-35Cs and F/A-18E/Fs intercept Chinese aircraft or missiles with AIM-120 AMRAAMs, leveraging F-35C stealth and sensors.
- MQ-25 Stingrays extend air wing range, allowing safer CVN positioning.
- Allied Support:
- Japanese Aegis destroyers and Taiwan’s Hsiung Feng III missiles engage Chinese forces closer to Taiwan.
- U.S. bombers (B-21, B-52) and Virginia-class submarines from Guam attrit Chinese assets.
- Challenges:
- Large salvos (20–24 missiles) may exhaust SM-3/SM-6 magazines, per CSIS wargames.
- Hypersonic missiles (e.g., YJ-21) challenge interceptors, though SM-6 upgrades help.
- Saturation attacks could overwhelm defenses.
Likely Outcome
- Chinese Success: A surprise salvo of 24 hypersonic missiles could sink or disable the CVN if targeting is accurate and U.S. defenses are overwhelmed, as in a 2023 Chinese simulation. However, U.S. EW and mobility make this unlikely.
- U.S. Defense: Aegis, EW, and decoys could intercept 50–70% of missiles, especially if the CVN is beyond 2,000 km. Damage is possible, but sinking is unlikely. A mission-kill could disrupt operations, though submarines and bombers continue the fight.
- Strategic Impact: A sunk CVN escalates the conflict, risking U.S. strikes on mainland China. CSIS wargames suggest U.S. resilience despite carrier losses.
Sources: U.S. Department of Defense 2020 China Military Power Report, CSIS and RAND wargames, International Institute for Strategic Studies, and X posts on Chinese missile tests (e.g., DF-26B 2020, YJ-21 2022).
